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RECENT DECISIONS
to recover damages for the injury which he suffered. Therefore
the contract by which the decedent agreed to exempt the defen-
dant from liability has no effect whatever on their right of
action."
In looking at decisions based upon the different statutes, it seems
apparent that none of them completely remedy the two wrongs in-
volved. They are concerned with either the rights of the decedent, or
the rights of his beneficiaries, but not both. The legislature of Wis-
consin, with several others, has gone a step further by enacting statutes
which not only allow the decedent's action to survive, but also com-
pensate for the resulting wrongs inflicted upon those who depended on
him for support and companionship. While such statutes ordinarily
limit the amount of recovery that can be had, such limitation is a rea-
sonable one and does afford substantial relief. 9
The policy evident in Wisconsin and states having similar statutes
is to provide complete relief for all injuries resulting from the wrong-
ful act which caused death.10 There is no particular reason why other
jurisdictions should limit the amount of damages to the amount which
the decedent might have recovered;" or determine the rights of bene-
ficiaries of the statutes solely on the basis of the rights of the decedent,
as was done in the instant case. Perhaps the courts have lost sight of
the legislative intent upon which the enactments were founded. If so,
it is incumbent upon such legislatures to reiterate and clarify their in-
tent by appropriate amendments and further enactments.
WILLIAM A. ADLER
Constitutional Law -Discrimination Between Natural and Natural-
ized Citizens - Plaintiff became a naturalized citizen in 1928. He went
to Palestine in 1934 and remained there until 1947, when he returned
to the United States. When he presented his certificate of citizenship
to the Immigration authorities at New York they excluded him on the
ground that he had expatriated himself under Section 804, 8 U.S.C.A.
and was an alien without a quota immigration visa. That section pro-
vided: "A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose
9 Supra, note 3 and note 4.
10 Brown v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (supra, note 7) ; Koehler v. Waukesha
Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926). These cases, in distinguishing be-
tween the two types of Wis. statutes, note that they give rise to two causes
of action: one, a survival of decedent's cause of action, and the other, a new
cause of action in favor of the deceased's beneficiaries. Thus, the injuries to




his nationality by:... (c) Residing continuously for five years in any
other foreign state .... ." The plaintiff claimed that the law arbitrarily
discriminated against naturalized citizens, and that no distinction could
be drawn between them and native born. Held: Since the legislation
was needed to lessen friction with foreign governments growing out of
disputes as to .the nationality of our naturalized citizens residing for
prolonged periods in foreign lands, and since the act dealt only with
a condition voluntarily brought about by one's own acts, with notice
of the consequences, it was not unconstitutional. Lapides v. Clark, 176
F. (2d) 619 (C.C.A., D.C. 1949).
The history of the section involved reveals that the State Depart-
ment, even before any legislation like the present, long made it a prac-
tice to deny protection to American Nationals living abroad beyond a
certain length of time due to the difficulty the encountered trying to
protect them.' This difficulty arose in part because of the adherence
by many nations to the rule of international law that a person cannot
expatriate himself without the consent of the sovereign and hence
when a naturalized citizen of this country went abroad, two nations
laid claim to his allegiance, the United States and his fatherland. The
problem naturally became more acute if the naturalized citizen returned
to the land of his birth and was there requested to perform the duties
of a citizen, such as submitting to the military-service laws.2 Congress,
in 1907, enacted into law a rebuttable presumption of expatriation on
the part of our naturalized citizens who remained abroad beyond a pre-
scribed length of time, and when the Nationality Act of 1940 was
passed this presumption was made a conclusive one in the form it exists
today. The change from a rebuttable to a conclusive presumption of
expatriation is due to the desire of Congress to deny the continued
privilege of citizenship to those who intend only to obtain its rights
but who lack a bona fide intention to assume its duties and come here
to be naturalized merely for their own protection, intending to go
abroad again clothed with the protection of the flag of the United
States.4
1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. III, p. 288 (1940).
2 To account for this additional difficulty, shorter lengths of time are needed
before the automatic presumption of expatriation applies when the naturalized
citizen resides in the land of his birth; see 8 U.S.C.A. 804, subsections (a)
and (b).
3 Act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1338, 8 U.S.C.A. 17; This act however, was
held to be merely declaratory of the there-to-fore existing practice, Camardo
v. Tillinghast, 29 F. (2d) 527 (C.C.A. 1st 1928).
486 Cong. Rec. 11948 (1940).
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Though the rule is oft repeated that "under our constitution a natu-
ralized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all
respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency", 5 yet it may be noted
that Congress is not limited as are the states in this matter since the
Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause but only re-
strains such discriminatory legislation as amounts to denial of due pro-
cess';6 which requires only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or capricious and that the means selected shall have real sub-
stantial relation to the object.7 Then too, the powers of the Federal
Government conferred upon it by reason of its being a sovereign state
are not strictly confined to those enumerated in the Constitution s and,
as pointed out in Mackenzie v. Hare,9 the courts "should hesitate long
before limiting or embarrassing such powers", especially those regard-
ing its relations and intercourse with other nations. The Court in the
Mackenzie case upheld legislation ° automatically expatriating a woman
who married a foreigner, on the ground that the identity of husband
and wife was not an accidental or arbitrary distinction but was neces-
sary to prevent embarrassments and, it may be, controversies with other
countries. It would seem then that since the legislation in question
follows the pattern of that involved in the Mackenzie case and attempts
to regulate residence abroad with a view towards prevention of inter-
national disputes, the constitutionality of it is not to be determined
with reference alone to the standard due process requirements.
However the Supreme Court has defined expatriation as "the volun-
tary renunciation or abandonment of allegiance"" and though this sec-
tion makes no exceptions for conditions beyond the control of the
individual,' such exceptions may very well be read into it by the
courts. Thus in Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolls,'3 the Court re-
fused to hold as expatriated one who was born in the United States,
taken to a Portuguese island by his parents, and there inducted into the
5 Laura v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22, 34 S.Ct. 10, 58 L.Ed. 101 (1913).
6 Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 320, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943).
7 Nebbia v. People of State of New York 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 501, 78 L.Ed.
940 (1933).8 United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216,
81 L.Ed. 255 (1936).
9239 U.S. 299, 311, 36 S.Ct. 106, 60 L.Ed. 207 (1916).
10 34 Stat. 1228, Chap. 2534, Comp. Stat. 1916, Sec. 3960.
21 Perkins v. EIg, 307 U.S. 325, 334, 59 S.Ct. 884, 83 L.Ed. 373 (1939).
12 This had been one of the contentions of the plaintiff in the instant case but
the Court dismissed it since the plaintiff gave no excuse or his own failure
to return, and its possible unconstitutional application to others in different
circumstances could not be considered.
'3 161 F. (2d) 860 (C.C.A. 1st 1947).
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Portuguese army against his will, in spite of the language of the
statute14 that said a national of the United States "shall lose his nation-
ality by:.. . (c) Entering or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign
state, , , " The same result has been reached regarding an oath of al-
legiance taken to a foreign state,1 5 making a formal renunciation of
nationality before a diplomatic officer of the United States, 6 holding
public office in a foreign state," and voting iri a political election in a
foreign state,'8 where the above named acts constituted automatic ex-
patriation under 8 U.S.C.A. 801, subsections (b) through (f), but
where the acts in those individual cases were not the voluntary acts
of the respective parties. The exceptions to the application of the sec-
tion that are allowed relieve to a great extent what would otherwise
amount to a sharp discrimination between the citizenship derived from
two different sources. Thus the automatic expatriation of the section
under discussion does not apply where the residence aboard is for edu-
cation, ill-health, purposes of employment where the naturalized citizen
is representing a business or charitable organization, and where he has
first resided in the United States for twenty-five years or until he
has attained the age of sixty-five years. 19 And then too, he can reside
abroad for any reason up to five years before the presumption takes
effect.20
This case gives certain effect to the express language of Congress
set forth in the section of the Nationality Act under discussion. The
legislation appears to be fair, both as to supporting a policy to avoid
foreign entanglements and as to preventing fraudulent use of the preci-
ous right of American citizenship by those who do not desire it; and
serves notice to the people of the world that they need only apply for
naturalization if they honestly desire to contribute to the future of
this country as well as to enjoy its present benefits.
WM. S. PFANKUCH
'14 Nationality Act of 1940, Sec. 401, 8 U.S.C.A. 801.
'5 In Re Gogal, 75 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
16Uichi Inouye et al. v. Clark et al., 73 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
'17 Attorney General of United States v. Rickets, 165 F. (2d) 193 (C.C.A. 9th
1947).
'
8 Etsuko Arikawa v. Acheson, 83 F. Supp. 473 (1949).
16 Nationality Act of 1940, Sec. 406 (c)-(d), 8 U.S.C.A. 806 (c)-(d).
20 The time is shorter if he has returned to the land of his former citizenship;
supra note 2.
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